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This paper measures the vulnerability of households in rural India, based upon the 
ICRISAT panel survey. We employ both ex ante and ex post measures of vulnerability. 
The latter are decomposed into aggregate and idiosyncratic risks and poverty 
components. Our decomposition shows that idiosyncratic risks account for the largest 
share, followed by poverty and aggregate risks. Despite some degree of risk-sharing, the 
landless or small farmers are vulnerable to idiosyncratic risks, forcing them to reduce 
consumption. Income-augmenting policies therefore must be combined with those that 
not only reduce aggregate and idiosyncratic risks but also build resilience against them. 
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The objective of this study is to quantify the vulnerability of rural households in the 
semi-arid region of south India to aggregate and idiosyncratic risks (crop and weather 
risks and illness and unemployment risks, respectively). Vulnerability is distinguishable 
from ‘poverty’1 in the sense that there exist those who are non-poor but vulnerable and 
those who are non-vulnerable but poor. However, as a measure of deprivation, 
vulnerability is more appealing as it takes into account not just fluctuating levels of 
living but also the resilience of subsets of households (e.g., the landless, smallholders) 
against aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. It is, however, more difficult to identify the 
vulnerable not only because there are different measures (e.g., ex ante versus ex post 
vulnerability) but also because tracking the wellbeing of a particular household over 
many years, or before and after a shock requires reliable panel data that are seldom 
available.  
There has been a surge of interest in measuring vulnerability (e.g., Hoddinott and 
Quisumbing 2003a, 2003b; Ligon 2005; Ligon and Schechter 2003; Gaiha and Imai 
2004; Dercon 2005). So one objective of the present study is to review different 
measures of vulnerability and apply them to the panel data for semi-arid rural south 
India. These studies also point to the need for designing anti-poverty policies to address 
vulnerability, especially in rural areas where agricultural yields and revenues fluctuate a 
great deal due to changes in weather, floods, pest infestation and market forces. Besides, 
different segments of rural population are exposed to various risks—especially 
idiosyncratic—in the absence of easy access to medical care, drinking water, unhygienic 
living conditions and limited opportunities for diversifying income sources. These 
difficulties are compounded by the lack of financial intermediation and formal 
insurance; credit market imperfections and weak infrastructure (e.g., physical isolation 
because of limited transportation facilities). More specifically, if policymakers design 
poverty alleviation policies in the current year on the basis of a poverty threshold of 
income in the previous year, the ‘poor’ who receive income support may have already 
escaped from poverty and the ‘non-poor’ who do not may have slipped into poverty due 
to various unanticipated shocks (e.g., changes in relative crop prices). One approach 
would be to focus on poverty dynamics (e.g., Gaiha and Deolalikar 1993; Baulch and 
Hoddinott 2000) or chronic poverty (e.g., Hulme, Moore and Shepherd 2001), taking 
into account poverty transition or the long-term poverty status ex post. Another and a 
more challenging, approach would be to combine both ex ante and ex post measures of 
vulnerability. This, however, presupposes that many of the risks—both aggregate and 
idiosyncratic—and the resilience of subsets of households against such shocks can be 
anticipated. This is, of course, easier said than done. It is nevertheless arguable that, to 
the extent that ex post measures of vulnerability can be combined with ex ante 
measures, it would help design a more effective strategy to deal with vulnerability. 
As a case study, we will construct vulnerability measures of households in semi-arid 
rural India, drawing upon the ICRISAT panel household data for 1975-84. While 
several recent studies analyse vulnerability using the ICRISAT data, few have employed 
the various measures proposed and focus on identifying who the vulnerable are and 
                                                 
1   See, for example, Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003a, 2003b), and World Bank (2000).    
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whether they are distinguishable from the poor in a static sense.2 So our analysis is 
designed to be more comprehensive and richer from a policy perspective. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a review of salient features of the ICRISAT 
panel survey is followed by a discussion of measurement errors in the consumption 
expenditure data and their implications for insurance. Section 3 gives an exposition of 
three different empirical methodologies used here to measure vulnerability of 
households. Econometric results and findings are summarized in section 4. The final 
section offers concluding observations.  
2 Data 
2.1 Salient  features 
The analysis is based on (a subset) of the ICRISAT village level studies (VLS) datasets 
that cover the semi-arid tract (SAT) in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. 
Agroclimatologically, the SAT includes those tropical regions where rainfall exceeds 
potential evaporation four to six months in a year. Mean annual rainfall ranges from 
about 400 to 1,200 mm. India’s SAT is vast and covers about 15 to 20 large regions, 
each embracing several districts. Based on cropping, soil and climatic criteria, three 
contrasting dryland agricultura l  r e g i o n s  w e r e  s e l e c t e d  b y  I C R I S A T :  t h e  T e l e n g a n a  
region in Andhra Pradesh, the Bombay Deccan in Maharashtra and the Vidarbha region 
also in Maharashtra. Three representative districts viz. Mahbubnagar in the Telengana 
region, Sholapur in the Bombay Deccan and Akola in the Vidarbha region were selected 
on rainfall, soil and cropping criteria. Next, typical talukas (i.e., smaller administrative 
units) within these districts were selected, followed by the selection of six representative 
villages within these talukas. Finally, a random stratified sample of 40 households was 
selected in each village. This comprised a sample of 30 cultivator and ten landless 
labour households. To ensure equal representation of different farm size groups, the 
cultivating households were first divided into three strata, each having an equal number 
of households. A random sample of ten households was drawn from each tercile. Ten 
landless labour households were also randomly selected. Landless labour households 
were defined as those operating less than half an acre (0.2 ha) and whose main source of 
income was agricultural wage earnings. All households were interviewed by 
investigators who resided in the sample villages, had a university degree in agricultural 
economics, came from rural backgrounds and spoke the local language. 
A fixed sample size of cultivator and landless labour households in each village means 
that the sampling fractions and relative farm sizes that demarcate the cultivator terciles 
vary from village to village. The likelihood that a village household was in the sample 
ranged from about one in four in the smaller Akola villages to about one in ten in the 
larger Mahbubnagar villages. Landless labour households are somewhat under-
represented in the sample. On average, across the six villages, they comprise about  
one-third of the households in the household population of interest, but their share in the 
sample is only one-quarter. However, since their mean household size is less than that 
                                                 
2   Examples include Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Chaudhuri and Paxson (1994), Townsend (1994), 
Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), Jacoby and Skoufias (1998), Lim and Townsend (1998), and Gaiha 
and Imai (2004).    
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of cultivator households, a one-quarter representation is a fair reflection of their 
presence in the individual population of interest (Walker and Ryan 1990). 
The data collected are based on panel surveys carried out at regular intervals from 1975 
to 1984 covering production, expenditure, time allocation, prices, wages and 
socioeconomic characteristics of the 240 households in the sample villages representing 
three agro-climatic zones in the semi-arid region in south India. A description of the 
agro-climatic and other characteristics of the sample villages is given in Appendix 1. 
Given the agro-climatic conditions and purposive selection of the villages, the VLS data 
are not representative of all of rural south India or, for that matter, even of its semi-arid 
region. Nevertheless, the longitudinal nature and richness in terms of variables included 
are what make the ICRISAT VLS data unique.  
The present analysis is based on data for 183 households belonging to five sample 
villages (excluding Kinkheda), as continuous data over the period 1975-84 are available 
only on this subset of households. This subsample is used to construct one measure of 
vulnerability i.e., vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP).3 However, given the debate 
on measurement errors in the consumption expenditure data, measures of vulnerability 
based on both consumption expenditure and income vulnerability as low expected 
utility (VEU) and vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (VER), the use of the 
original ICRISAT data is problematic. We shall therefore use expenditure data provided 
by Gautam (1991) for three villages, namely Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara, to derive 
estimates of VEU and VER measures.4  
2.2  Risks and insurance in India  
Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) estimate the household response to anticipated and 
unanticipated income changes, using the ICRISAT data. In their analysis, if the 
permanent income hypothesis holds, the consumption change is affected positively by 
unanticipated income changes and not by anticipated income changes. Using the data 
for Aurepalle and Kanzara, their analysis does not reject the permanent income 
hypothesis.  
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993) focus on the role of bullocks as buffer stock for 
consumption by credit-constrained households in rural India. They find that the sale of 
bullocks increases when incomes are low, and purchases increase when incomes are 
high. On the other hand, Lim and Townsend (1998), through a detailed investigation of 
how rural farming households financed their monthly deficit, reach the conclusion that 
livestock, including bullocks and other capital assets, play little part in smoothing 
intertemporal shocks. Instead, buffer stock of crop inventory and currency, together 
with credit or insurance, are much more important. Chaudhuri and Paxson (1994), also 
using the monthly ICRISAT data, investigate the impact of seasonality on income and 
                                                 
3   An exposition of different measures of vulnerability is given in a subsequent section. 
4   Even though it is widely believed that the ICRISAT data are rich and reliable, they are, of course, not 
free from some measurement problems. Some doubts, for example, have been raised about own 
consumption of home production and grain stocks. Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) report a 
systematic underreporting of own consumption of crop outputs produced. Without an appropriate 
adjustment, Townsend (1994) overestimates the degree of risk sharing in the village. See Gautam 
(1991) for details of sources for the measurement errors.   
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consumption. They conclude that seasonal patterns in consumption are common across 
households within villages but are unrelated to income seasonality.   
On risk-sharing, Townsend (1994) tests the perfect risk-sharing hypothesis that 
household consumption is fully insured against idiosyncratic shocks and thus depends 
only on the aggregate risk. Although this hypothesis is rejected, he shows that the model 
provides a surprisingly good benchmark in that household consumption comoves with 
average village consumption, implying risk-sharing among households. Ravallion and 
Chaudhuri (1997) point to a weaker result, if an allowance is made for measurement 
errors in own consumption and alternative specifications and estimation procedures are 
considered. They also draw attention to the possibility that common signals about future 
income, rather than consumption insurance, would generate comovements in 
consumption, under the permanent income hypothesis. Lim and Townsend (1998), 
however, disagree on the grounds that there is non-negligible social interaction among 
households, as credit/insurance/gifts account for a large part of the difference between 
expenditure and revenue.  
Responses to aggregate and idiosyncratic risks take other forms, too. Changes in child 
school attendance (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997) and in labour hours in off-farm markets 
(Kochar 1995, 1999), for example, have been reported. Another recent study by Gaiha 
and Imai (2004) examines the vulnerability of rural households to poverty when a 
negative crop shock occurs, using a dynamic panel data model that takes into account 
effects of crop shocks of varying intensity and duration. They show that even sections 
of relatively affluent households are highly vulnerable to long spells of poverty when 
severe crop shocks occur in consecutive years.  
Although conclusions differ depending on the questions asked and methodologies used, 
some of the major findings are summarized below. 
i)  Both poor and relatively affluent households are vulnerable to aggregate 
shocks such as crop shocks; 
ii)  The ability to cope with shocks is generally limited due to limited consumption 
insurance or risk sharing and credit constraints; 
iii)  Risk-coping ability is likely to differ among households because of differences 
in assets, such as livestock, crop inventory and currency. As a result, the poor 
(mostly assetless) are more likely to increase child or adult labour hours; 
iv)  Existing policy interventions, such as the employment guarantee scheme, do 
not necessarily reach the poor despite their potential risk-reducing roles. So 
there is a case for more effective risk reducing, mitigating and coping 
interventions alongside income-augmenting policies.     
3 Methodology   
Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003a, 2003b) provide a comprehensive review of recent 
approaches and a ‘toolkit’ to quantify vulnerability of households and data requirements  
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identifying the following three major approaches used in the empirical literature on 
vulnerability.5  
3.1  Vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP) 
VEP is an ex ante vulnerability measure, proposed by Chaudhuri, Jalan and Suryahadi 
(2002) who apply it to the Indonesian household data.   
Consider first an example of VEP. This is the case of vulnerability defined as the 
probability that a household will fall into poverty in the future.  
( ) z c Pr V 1 t , i it ≤ = +    (1)  
where vulnerability of household at time t,  it V is the probability that the i-th household’s 
level of consumption at time t+1,  1 t , i c + , will be below the poverty line, z.6 
In a variant that allows for the degree of vulnerability to rise with the length of the time 
horizon, vulnerability of household h for n periods, denoted as  () ⋅ R  for risk, is the 
probability of observing at least one spell of poverty for n periods, which as shown 
below is one minus the probability of no episodes of poverty: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] z c Pr 1 ..., , z c Pr 1 1 z , n R n t , i 1 t , i i < − < − − = + +    (2) 
Following this definition and using  () ⋅ I  as an indicator equalling 1 if the condition is 
true and zero otherwise, an alternative measure of vulnerability is that a household is 
vulnerable if the risk in n periods is greater than a threshold probability, p.7 
() ( ) {} p z , n R I z , n , p V it i > =    (3)  
Neither (1) nor (3) takes into account other dimensions of poverty (e.g., depth of 
poverty). This limitation is easily overcome by rewriting Equation (1) as   
() [] () []
α
+ + + − ⋅ ≤ ⋅ = ⋅ = ∑ ∑ z c z z c I p z , c P p V 1 t , i 1 t , i s s
S
1 t , i S s
S
it    (1′) 
where  S s
Sp ∑  is the sum of the probability of all possible ‘states of the world’, s in 
period t+1 and α is the welfare weight attached to the gap between the benchmark and 
the welfare measure (as in the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty measure 1984). In 
                                                 
5  This section provides a summary of the methodological sections of Hoddinott and Quisumbing 
(2003b). See Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003b) for more details.   
6   The poverty cut-off point we use represents the minimum cost of a nutritionally adequate diet i.e., Rs 
180 per capita per year (at 1960-61 prices), which has been widely used in the literature (see Gaiha 
and Imai 2004 for more details).  
7  See, for example, Pritchett, Suryahadi and Sumarto (2000).  
6 
principle, this welfare weight could take values 0,  1,  2.8 Aggregating across N 
households,9  
() [] () []
α




t    (4)  
A vulnerability measure such as (4) has considerable relevance. In Indonesia, for 
example, the headcount index of poverty was low before the financial crisis but rose 
sharply in its wake. This implies that a large proportion of those above the poverty line 
were vulnerable to shocks. There are two risks in such a context. If the headcount index 
is low, governments/donors might become complacent. If negative shocks are frequent 
and severe, such complacency would be misplaced. Besides, if the characteristics of 
those above the poverty line but vulnerable to shocks differ from those of the poor, 
targeting the latter may miss a significant proportion of those whose living standards 
may decline sharply when a shock occurs. 
Empirically, a variant of VEP is derived by the following procedure, as in Chaudhuri, 
Jalan and Suryahadi (2002). The consumption function is estimated as: 
i i i e X c ln + = β    (5)   
where  i c  is per capita consumption expenditure for the i-th household, Xi represents a 
bundle of observable household characteristics, β is a vector of coefficients of 
household characteristics, and ei is a mean-zero disturbance term that captures 
idiosyncratic shocks that contribute to different per capita consumption levels. It is 
assumed that the structure of the economy is relatively stable over time and hence, 
future consumption stems solely from the uncertainty about the idiosyncratic shocks, ei. 
It is also assumed that the variance of the disturbance term depends on: 
θ = σ i
2
i , e X     (6)  
The estimates of β and θ could be obtained using a three-step feasible generalized least 
squares (FGLS). Using the estimates  ˆ β  and  ˆ θ, we can compute the expected log 
consumption and the variance of log consumption for each household as follows: 
β = ˆ X ] X C [ln E i i i    (7) 
θ = ˆ X ] X C [ln V i i i     (8) 
By assuming  h ln c as normally distributed, the estimated probability that a household 
will be poor in the future (say, at time t+1), is given by: 
                                                 
8  These three values of α represent the headcount, depth of poverty and distributionally sensitive 
measures of poverty in the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke class of poverty indices. 
9  In a related measure, Kamanou and Morduch (2002) define vulnerability as expected change in 
poverty, as opposed to expected poverty per se. Specifically, they define vulnerability in a population 















ˆ X z ln
X z ln c ln r P ˆ v ˆ
i
i
i i i    (9)   
This is an ex ante vulnerability measure that can be estimated by cross-sectional data. 
Equation (9) will provide the probability of a household at time t becoming poor at t + 1 
given the distribution of consumption at t.     
A merit of this vulnerability measure is that it can be estimated by cross-sectional data. 
However, the measure correctly reflects a household’s vulnerability only if the 
distribution of consumption across households, given the household characteristics at 
one time, represents the time-series variation of consumption of the household. Hence 
this measure requires a large sample in which some households experience a good 
period and others suffer from negative shocks. Also, the measure is unlikely to reflect 
unexpected large negative shocks (e.g., Asian financial crisis), if we use the cross-
section data for a normal year.  
The sample size of the ICRISAT data is not large enough for estimating VEP measures. 
So we have included all households in the five sample villages. Also, to make our 
results comparable with some earlier studies (e.g., Gaiha and Deolalikar 1993; Gaiha 
and Imai 2004), we replace log consumption with log income per capita in the above 
specification. The VEP simply assumes that consumption vulnerability derives from the 
stochastic property of the intertemporal consumption stream it faces (Chaudhuri, Jalan 
and Suryahadi 2002). Since the time-series variation of log income per capita with 
particular household characteristics can be approximated by the cross-sectional 
variation of the households with similar characteristics, consumption in the above 
specification can be replaced by income. Also, nothing precludes us from extending it to 
the panel data. So we will use both annual cross-section components and panel data in 
the ICRISAT data to construct VEP measures. Our specification of VEP can be written 
as follows, based on two earlier studies (Gaiha and Deolalikar 1993; Gaiha and Imai 
2004).  
i 3 i 2 i 1 i i e H L X Y ln + ′ + ′ + ′ = β β β    (10)   
3 i 2 i 1 i i , e
2 H L X θ θ θ σ ′ + ′ + ′ =    (11) 
where i indexes the household.  i Y is per capita annual household income from all sources 
(in constant prices) in a particular crop year.  i X  is a vector of household characteristics 
(e.g., age of household head and its square, household size and its square, and caste).  i L  is a 
vector of owned land area and its square, the share of irrigated land in the total,and non-land 
assets (i.e., production assets) and its square.  i H  is a vector of human capital, such as 
schooling years of household head.  i , e
2 σ  is the variance of the disturbance term which is 
affected by various household characteristics. This can be estimated by a three-step 
FGLS.10  
                                                 
10  See Chaudhuri, Jalan and Suryahadi (2002), and Hoddinott and Quisumbing (2003b) for technical 
details.   
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3.2  Vulnerability as expected low utility (VEU) 
There is a problematic or perverse feature of VEP. In case α > 1, the FGT poverty index 
attributes risk aversion to households. Consider two scenarios. In the first, the risk-
averse household is certain that expected consumption in period t + 1 will be just below 
the poverty line so that the probability of poverty (or vulnerability) is one. In the second 
scenario, while expected mean consumption is unchanged, there is a 0.5 probability that 
this household’s consumption will be just above the poverty line (and above the mean) 
and a 0.5 probability that the consumption will be just below the mean. Since the 
household is risk averse, it would prefer the certain consumption in the first scenario to 
the expected in the second but the vulnerability is lower in the second (it drops from 1 
to 0.5). Moreover, even when α > 1, the FGT index implies increasing absolute risk 
aversion, contrary to empirical evidence. This weakness is sought to be overcome by 
Ligon and Schechter (2003). A brief exposition of this measure is given below. 
In this measure of VEU, vulnerability is defined as the difference between the utility 
derived from some level of certainty-equivalent consumption, zce, at and above which 
the household is not considered vulnerable and the expected utility of consumption. In 
other words, this certainty-equivalent consumption is akin to a poverty line. 
Consumption of a household, ci, has a distribution in different states of the world, so 
this measure takes the form: 
() ( ) i i ce i i c EU z U V − =    (12)  
where  i U   is a (weakly) concave, strictly increasing function. Equation (12) can be 
rewritten as:  
() ( ) [] () ( ) [] i i i i i i ce i i c EU Ec U Ec U z U V − + − =    (13)   
The first bracketed term on the right is a measure of poverty in terms of the difference 
in utility between z and c. The second term measures the risk that household h faces. 
The latter can be decomposed into aggregate or covariate and idiosyncratic risk, as 
shown below.  
() ( ) ii c e i i V= U z - U Ec ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (poverty) 
 +  () () { } ii i i t UE c- E UE c x ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   (covariate or aggregate risk) 
 +  () () { } ii t i i EU E c x - EU c ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   (idiosyncratic risk)  (14) 
where  () t i x c E  is an expected value of consumption conditional on a vector of covariant 
variables,  t x.   
Aggregating across households, an estimate of aggregate vulnerability is obtained: 
() ( )() () () { } {
N
ic e i i i i i it i VEU = 1 N U z -U Ec + U Ec -EU E c x ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ∑
 
  () () { } ii t i i +E U Ecx - E U c ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦    (15)  
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This decomposition is useful as it allows an assessment of whether vulnerability is 
largely a result of factors underlying poverty (e.g., low assets and/or low returns from 
them) or of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, and the inability to cope with them. 
However, two limitations must be noted. One is that the results may differ depending on 
the form of the utility function assumed.11 The second is that the measurement is in 
terms of utility (i.e., utils).  








) c ( U
1
   (16) 
where γ  denotes household’s sensitivity to risk and inequality. They set γ = 2 following 
the microeconometric literature. We have set γ = 2 in the present study.  
They assume:  
β η α it t i it t it X ) X , X c ( E + + =    (17) 
With the panel data, one can estimate αi, unobservable time-invariant individual effects, 
ηt, time-effects same across households and β, effects of household characteristics or 
other observable factors on consumption. Using two-way error component model 
(Baltagi 2005), Equation (17) can be estimated as:  
it it i t i it c= Xβ +η +α +v    (18)   
where vit  is an error term which is also independent and identically distributed   
(~ IID (0, σ 
2
v). 
Our purpose is to decompose the total vulnerability arising from poverty and risk into 
four components using the estimation results for (18). Equation (14) can be rewritten as 
(14′) by assuming that z, the poverty line, is the mean consumption and by including in 
it the unexplained risk and measurement error.  
() ( ) ii c i i t V= U E - U Ec ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (poverty) 
() () { } ii t i i t +U E c - E U Ecx ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   (covariate or aggregate risk)  (14′) 
() () { } ii t i i t i t +E U Ecx -E U cx, x ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (idiosyncratic  risk) 
() () { } ii t i t i i +E U Ecx, x - E U c ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦   (unexplained risk and measurement error) 
We can derive various conditional expectations in (14′) to decompose the entire 
vulnerability measure (or VEU measure) for each household by applying restricted least 
                                                 
11  It is, however, arguable that, while the results may be sensitive to the functional form assumed, the 
relative components of the decomposition are not likely to be affected much (Hoddinott and 
Quisumbing 2003b).  
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squares to Equation (18) and then substituting each conditional expectation of 
consumption into (16).  
As noted earlier, we use the expenditure data including food and non-food components, 
created by Gautam (1991) and used by Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), since 
substitution of consumption by income in (16) is problematic and idiosyncratic income 
risks in (14) may be insured. Consumption equation, as in (18), should have income on 
the right-hand side if the income data are available, as in our case. However, income, if 
used as the explanatory variable of consumption, is likely to be endogenous for various 
reasons. For example, savings and liquidation of various household assets (e.g., 
livestock) are likely to influence not only consumption but also income, since a part of 
the assets is typically used for production purposes. Food consumption affects the 
productivity of workers and thus increases income through improvements in nutritional 
status. Hence, in estimating Equation (18), we use the instrumental variable (IV) 
specification where income is treated as endogenous. As in Ligon and Schechter (2003), 
the average consumption of all households is normalized to be unity. As a consequence, 
if resources are allocated in such a way that there is no vulnerability (i.e., no inequality 
or poverty and no risk), then each household’s utility would be one. Also, if Vi in (14′) 
is 0.25, then the utility of the average household is 25 per cent less than it would be if 
resources could be distributed so as to eliminate inequality among households and risk 
in consumption. 
The IV estimation for VEU can be carried out in the same way as for VEP.  
First stage: 
it i 4 t 3 it 2 it 1 it it e D H L X y + + ′ + ′ + ′ + ′ = μ β β β β    (19) 
Second stage:  
it i 4 t 3 it 2 it it 1 it v D H X y c + + ′ + ′ + ′ + = α γ γ γ γ  (20)   
where time effects are replaced by a vector of year dummies, D′t, for simplicity.  
Li , a vector of owned land area, the share of irrigated land and non-land assets, are used 
as instruments. μi and αi are unobserved individual effects. One cannot deny the 
possibility of the effects of Li on consumption, but it seems natural to assume that these 
variables first affect income. Random-effects specification is chosen over fixed effects, 
following the Hausmann specification test. We then compute vulnerability by various 
conditional expectations of consumption, as in (14′).  
3.3  Vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (VER) 
In the absence of effective risk management strategy, shocks result in welfare loss to the 
extent that they lead to reduction of consumption. In this sense, it is a consequence of 
uninsured exposure to risk. VER is designed to assess ex post welfare loss from a 
negative shock (e.g., a flood), as opposed to an ex ante assessment of future poverty in 
VEP.   
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Consider a household, i, residing in a village, v, at time t. Let  itv c ln Δ denote change in 
log consumption or the growth rate of consumption per capita of household i between t 
and t-1 and  () tv i S  aggregate/covariate shocks and  () itv i S  idiosyncratic shocks. Further, let 
v D be a set of binary variables identifying each community/village separately and X be 
a vector of household characteristics. An estimate of VER could then be obtained as: 
() ∑∑∑ ε Δ + η + δ + β + λ = Δ ν ii itv itv tv v itv i tv i itv X D S S c ln    (21)  
In the present context, λ and β are of particular interest as they seek to capture the effects 
of covariate, Stv and idiosyncratic shocks, Sitv, respectively. Note that these effects are net 
of coping strategies and public responses.  
A variant of (21) that has figured prominently in recent studies involves replacing 
∑i tv iS λ and  ∑i itv iS β with  ( ) vt y ln Δ —the growth rate of average community/village 
income—and  itv y ln Δ —the growth rate of household income, respectively. These 
variables are supposed to represent the combined effect of all covariate and 
idiosyncratic shocks.  
( ) itv itv vt itv itv X y ln y ln c ln ε δ γ β α Δ + + Δ + + = Δ  (22)   
Much of the empirical literature has concentrated on verifying whether β = 0, consistent 
with complete risk sharing. Although complete risk-sharing is rejected, estimates of β 
are generally low, suggesting that growth of consumption is related to growth rate of 
income but less so than under the alternative hypothesis of no risk-sharing. The higher 
the estimate of β, the greater the vulnerability of consumption to income risk. In our 
specification we include schooling years of household head and their squares, caste, 
household size and their squares and the first differences of household size and their 
squares in Xitv.  
One limitation of measures of vulnerability based on Equations (21) and (22) is the 
presumption that positive and negative income shocks have symmetric effects. Ability 
to deal with such shocks, however, differs in general and between different groups of 
households. So to interpret β in (22) as a measure of vulnerability, as opposed to a 
measure of consumption insurance, may be misleading. This could be overcome by 
replacing  ∆ln yitv  with two measures of positive and negative income changes 
(Hoddinott and Quisumbing 2003b). 
In the present study, we use  ( ) vt y ln Δ  as a proxy for the aggregate shock as in Townsend 
(1994) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997). We also use the crop shock measure for 
Stv, following Gaiha and Imai (2004). The production shock for each household in the 
village is measured in terms of a deviation from a semi-logarithmic trend in crop 
production at the village level minus household’s own crop income. Village crop 







=∑   
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where  jt c  is crop income of household j at t, and n is the number of households in each 
village. A time trend is fitted to () it C ln , as shown below.  
() T b b C ln 1 0 it + =  (23)   
A measure of crop shock is then the deviation of the  () it C ln  from its trend value,  ( ) it C ˆ ln , 
as shown in Equation (24).12  
() ( ) it it it C ˆ ln C ln S − =    (24)  
4 Results   
We carried out econometric estimation based on the specification in the previous section 
and obtained vulnerability measures. In this section, we will first briefly discuss the 
estimation results and then summarize vulnerability measures across different 
household groups, classified by landholding, educational attainment of household head 
and caste.   
4.1  Vulnerability as expected poverty (VEP) 
We applied Equations (10) and (11) to each annual cross-sectional component of the  
10-year panel data along the lines of Chaudhuri, Jalan and Suryahadi (2002). The cross- 
sectional results are given in Tables 1-4. Results based on GLS panel data, where cross-
sectional heteroscedasticity is modelled as in Equation (6), are shown in the last column 
of Table 4.  
The results for log income per capita are generally plausible except that the coefficient 
of schooling years of household head is not significant in most cases. Only in 1982 and 
1983 (in Table 3), the coefficients of schooling years are positive and significant at the 
10 per cent level. Age of household head has a positive and significant effect and its 
square has a negative and significant effect, reflecting that households with older heads 
tend to have higher incomes per capita, but this positive effect weakens with age.     
                                                 
12 Crop shocks occur at different times in a year, given the diversity of cropping systems in the sample 
villages. As shown in Appendix 1, traditional cropping systems embrace the rainy season cereal/pulse 
intercrop in Aurepalle and the post-rainy season sorghum systems in Shirapur and Kalman. What is 
also observed is irrigated paddy production in Dokur and Aurepalle and hybrid sorghum in Kanzara 
and Kinkheda (Gaiha and Imai 2004). As shown in Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix 2, the crop shocks in 
the sample villages in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra over the period 1975-84 were frequent and 
large. What is also striking is that while these shocks were similar in the Maharashtra villages, this 
was not the case in the Andhra Pradesh villages. In the latter, not just the intensity but also the pattern 
varied significantly. For example, a large negative shock in one village coincided with a large positive 
shock in another. Considering that large fractions of households depend on agriculture as the main 
source of livelihood, such shocks are bound to have significant effects on household incomes (Gaiha 
and Imai 2004).   
 
Table 1 
Results for VEP (vulnerability as expected poverty) measure, 1975-77 
 1975    1976  1977 
  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ)  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ)  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ) 
 Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value 
Xi                                
Age of household head  0.0135  (0.82)  -0.0151 (-0.20)   0.0149    (0.68)  0.0740 (0.89)   0.0050    (0.24)  -0.0380 (-0.41) 
Age of household head squared   -0.0001  (-0.80) 0.0001 (0.12)    -0.0002    (-0.75)  -0.0007 (-0.78)   0.0000    (0.11)  0.0004 (0.41) 
Household size   -0.1767  (-3.54)** -0.3035 (-1.64)   -0.2606    (-4.50)** -0.2096 (-1.12)   -0.2686    (-6.31)** 0.0506 (0.25) 
Household size squared  0.0060  (1.75)+  0.0136 (1.15)   0.0117    (3.30)** 0.0112 (1.00)   0.0105    (3.98)** -0.0010 (-0.09) 
Caste dummies  (high)  0.1909  (1.85)+  0.6303 (1.30)   0.3880    (2.65)** -0.3037 (-0.57)   -0.0491    (-0.40)  0.3082 (0.53) 
 (middle  high)  0.3610  (3.88)** 0.2954 (0.62)   0.4097    (2.96)** -0.2134 (-0.42)   0.2630    (2.41)*  -0.1341 (-0.24) 
 (middle  low)  0.1531  (1.57)  0.8427 (1.87)+   0.1167    (0.79)  0.3488 (0.71)   -0.0329    (-0.30)  0.0248 (0.05) 
Li                                
Owned area of land  0.0848 (4.56)** 0.0102 (0.14)   0.0202   (0.73)  0.0398 (0.47)    0.0798   (4.30)** -0.1109 (-1.22) 
Owned area squared  -0.0016  (-2.48)*  -0.0002 (-0.08)   -0.0009    (-0.84)  0.0001 (0.04)   -0.0019    (-3.07)** 0.0016 (0.53) 
Share of irrigated land  0.0037  (4.08)** -0.0050 (-1.03)   0.0042    (2.66)** -0.0012 (-0.21)   0.0048    (3.16)** 0.0022 (0.34) 
Non-land production assets  0.0000  (2.32)* 0.0001 (1.69)+    0.0001   (2.85)** 0.0001 (1.06)   0.0001   (3.22)** 0.0001 (1.59) 
Non-land assets squared  0.0000  (-1.28)  0.0000 (-1.71)+   0.0000    (-0.81)  0.0000 (-1.76)+  0.0000    (-1.00)  0.0000 (-1.28) 
Hi                                
Schooling yrs of household head  -0.0006  (-0.02) 0.2595 (2.16)*   0.0275    (0.61) 0.0484 (0.36)    0.0551   (1.56)  -0.0645 (-0.44) 
Schooling yrs squared  0.0030  (1.80)+  -0.0283 (-2.46)*   -0.0028    (-0.56)  0.0029 (0.23)   -0.0045    (-1.12)  0.0079 (0.58) 
constant 6.0888  (13.90)  -1.8822 (-1.03)   6.6271   (12.71)  -4.0175 (-2.04)   7.0189    (14.01)  -2.5422 (-1.12) 
  
  
No. of observations  198    198    200    200  198    198   
F   21.74**   1.53    11.96**   0.63    16.31    0.45   
R squared  0.6245   0.1045   0.4695  0.0454    0.5551    0.0340 
Notes:  ** indicates the coefficient is significant at 1% level;  
  * = significant at 5% level; 







Results for VEP (vulnerability as expected poverty) measure, 1978-80 
 1978    1979  1980 
  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ)  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ)  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ) 
 Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value 
Xi                                
Age of household head  0.0108   (0.54)  0.0172 (0.19)    0.0053   (0.27)  0.0303  (0.35)   0.0338    (1.15)  -0.1168  (-1.22) 
Age of household head squared   0.0000   (-0.07) -0.0001  (-0.16)    0.0000   (0.20)  -0.0003  (-0.37)   -0.0002   (-0.84)  0.0012 (1.34) 
Household size   -0.2135   (-4.47)** 0.0109  (0.05)   -0.2194   (-4.77)** -0.3899  (-2.09)*   -0.0816    (-1.87)+ -0.0877 (-0.47) 
Household size squared  0.0070   (2.33)*  0.0002 (0.01)    0.0076    2.82**  0.0150  (1.33)   0.0011    (0.47)  0.0016 (0.15) 
Caste dummies (high)  0.1976   (1.61)  0.5528 (1.01)    0.3507    2.94**  0.5456  (1.07)   0.2084    (1.62)  -0.0990  (-0.18) 
  (middle high)  0.2552   (2.32)*  0.1801  (0.34)   0.2695    2.64**  -0.2810  (-0.56)   0.2052    (1.73)+ 0.0626 (0.12) 
  (middle low)  0.2439   (2.21)*  0.3591  (0.71)    0.1069   (0.99) 0.0477  (0.10)    -0.0468   (-0.38)  0.1696  (0.34) 
Li                                
Owned area of land  0.0519   (2.85)** 0.0155 (0.18)    0.0819    4.04**  0.0620  (0.70)   0.0203    (0.82)  -0.0486  (-0.56) 
Owned area squared  -0.0009   (-1.78)+  -0.0014  (-0.50)   -0.0020   (-2.89)** -0.0030  (-0.94)   -0.0003   (-0.32)  0.0015 (0.44) 
Share of irrigated land  0.0068   (4.36)** 0.0042 (0.67)    0.0069    5.97** -0.0001  (-0.02)   0.0038    (1.98)* 0.0136  (2.73)** 
Non-land production assets  0.0001   (3.57)** 0.0000 (-0.26)   0.0000    2.78**  0.0001 (1.39)   0.0000    (2.27)* 0.0001  (2.05)* 
Non-land assets squared  0.0000   (-1.91)+  0.0000 (-0.48)   0.0000   (-2.21)*  0.0000  (-1.85)+   0.0000    (-0.89)  0.0000  (-1.70)+ 
Hi                                
Schooling yrs of household head  0.0239   (0.68) -0.1193  (-0.87)    0.0285   (0.79)  -0.1661  (-1.25)   -0.0334   (-1.09)  -0.1071  (-0.80) 
Schooling yrs squared  -0.0032   (-0.81)  0.0150  (1.16)    -0.0034   (-0.8)  0.0184  (1.47)    0.0018   (0.63)  0.0054  (0.42) 
Constant 6.6375    (13.32)  -3.4747  (-1.56)   6.7105   (13.10)  -2.2948  (-1.02)   5.6488    (7.49)  -0.1237  (-0.05) 
  
  
No. of observations  197    197    196    196  196    196   
F   24.25**    0.41     28.61**    1.31   4.50**    1.45    
R  squared  0.6510  0.0400   0.6888   0.0922  0.2583   0.2182   
Note:  ** indicates the coefficient is significant at 1% level;  
  * = significant at 5% level; 





Results for VEP (vulnerability as expected poverty) measure, 1981-83 
 1981  1982  1983 
  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ)  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ)  Log (income p. c.) (β) Variance (θ) 
 Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value 
Xi                                
Age of household head  0.0466   (1.44)  -0.2015 (-2.27)*  0.0788    (2.75)**  -0.2454 (-2.23)*  0.0346    (1.51)  0.0487  (0.48) 
Age of household head squared   -0.0004   (-1.34) 0.0018  (2.17)* -0.0007   (-2.68)** 0.0024  (2.37)*  -0.0003   (-1.59)  -0.0005  (-0.57) 
Household size   -0.1218   (-3.45)**  0.2270 (1.47)  -0.1872    (-6.84)**  0.2534 (1.34) -0.1334    (-4.58)**  0.1538  (1.08) 
Household size squared  0.0026   (1.69)+  -0.0197 (-2.28)*  0.0059    (5.18)**  -0.0182 (-1.70)+ 0.0023    (1.92)+  -0.0074  (-1.03) 
Caste dummies   (high)  0.0299   (0.24)  -0.2172 (-0.46)  0.2699    (2.46)*  -0.3503 (-0.62) 0.0542    (0.49)  0.1073  (0.21) 
  (middle high)  0.1070   (0.88)  -0.1174  (-0.26)  0.2664   (2.64)** -0.7467  (-1.34)  0.2909   (2.52)*  0.3196  (0.63) 
  (middle low)  -0.1632   (-1.18)  0.5152  (1.15)  -0.0093   (-0.08) -0.1218  (-0.23)  -0.0408   (-0.34)  0.6130  (1.24) 
Li                            
Owned area of land  0.0482   (2.03)*  -0.0019 (-0.02)  0.0533    (2.68)**  -0.0888 (-0.88) 0.1132    (4.97)**  0.0072  (0.08) 
Owned area squared  -0.0018   (-2.32)*  -0.0013  (-0.41) -0.0020    (-2.01)*  0.0032  (0.85) -0.0026    (-3.30)**  -0.0009  (-0.25) 
Share of irrigated land  0.0055   (4.03)**  0.0014 (0.30)  0.0032    (3.51)** -0.0066  (-1.23) 0.0042    (2.94)**  0.0018  (0.33) 
Non-land production assets  0.0000   (4.13)** 0.0001  (2.10)*  0.0000    (4.99)** 0.0001  (2.54)*  0.0000   (0.12)  0.0000  (0.72) 
Non-land assets squared  0.0000   (-3.68)** 0.0000  (-0.96)  0.0000   (-5.11)** 0.0000  (-2.09)* 0.0000    (1.63)  0.0000  (-0.99) 
Hi                            
Schooling yrs of household head  0.0267   (0.80) -0.1195  (-1.03)  0.0526   (1.76)+  -0.2586 (-1.79)+  0.0539    (1.75)+  -0.0487 (-0.38) 
Schooling yrs squared  -0.0036   (-0.98)  0.0071 (0.63)  -0.0037    (-1.00)  0.0206 (1.48) -0.0025    (-0.78)  0.0014  (0.11) 
Constant 5.4574    (6.33)  2.0132  (0.84) 5.0376    (6.73)  2.5040  (0.82) 6.1234    (9.34)  -4.6948  (-1.64) 
  
  
No. of observations  197    197    197    197  198    198   
F   7.72**    1.81     22.89**    1.98     12.29**    0.51    
R squared  0.3726    0.1219    0.6378    0.1321   0.4846    0.0378  
Note:  ** indicates the coefficient is significant at 1% level;  
  * = significant at 5% level; 







Results for VEP (vulnerability as expected poverty) measure, 1984 and panel estimation for 1976-84 
  1984  GLS panel estimation 
 




Log (income p. c.) 
 (β) 
  Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff.  t-value 
Xi                
Age of household head  0.0509   (2.05)* 0.0889 (0.73)    0.0209    (3.75)** 
Age of household head squared  -0.0005  (-2.43)* -0.0010 (-0.93)    -0.0002    (-2.97)** 
Household size   -0.1493  (-4.23)** -0.0241 (-0.13)   -0.1841    (-17.56)** 
Household size squared  0.0039   (2.57)* -0.0048 (-0.50)    0.0056    (9.23)** 
Caste dummies   (high)  -0.0138  (-0.10) 0.5582 (0.92)    0.2223    (7.03)** 
  (middle high)  0.2728   (2.19)*  0.0638 (0.10)   0.2894    (9.96)** 
  (middle low)  0.1067   (0.78)  0.6775 (1.16)   0.0689    (2.24)* 
Li                 
Owned area of land  0.0455   (1.32)  0.0119 (0.09)   0.0694    (12.71)** 
Owned area squared  -0.0013  (-1.19)  0.0015 (0.33)   -0.0015    (7.14)** 
Share of irrigated land  0.0019   (0.53) 0.0172 (1.72)+   0.0031    (9.02)** 
Non-land production assets  0.0000   (3.39)** 0.0000 (0.79)   0.0000   (14.49)** 
Non-land assets squared  0.0000  (-2.05)* 0.0000 (-1.62)    0.0000    (-8.47)** 
Hi                 
Schooling yrs of hh head  -0.0282  (-0.79) -0.2595 (-1.77)+   0.0083    (1.05) 
Schooling yrs squared  0.0056   (1.37) 0.0222 (1.62)    0.0000    (0.00) 
Constant 5.7466    (7.85)  -4.6059 (-1.33)   6.3717    (45.03) 
      
      
No. of observations  119    119     1,896   
F   17.68**    1.39     Wald Chi
2 (13)  
R squared  0.7042     0.1575    Log likelihood  -1,285 
Notes:   ** indicates the coefficient is significant at 1% level; * = significant at 5% level; + = significant at 
10% level. 
  In 1984 the data are available for only three villages, Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara; 
  Estimation results for variance in the case of panel regression are not provided by the 
programme. 
 
Caste dummies have significant coefficients in the panel regression. In particular, ‘high 
caste’ and ‘middle-high castes’ have generally positive and significant coefficients in 
cross-sectional regressions except in a few years. Owned area of land has a positive and 
significant effect while its square has a negative and significant effect in both cross-
sectional regressions (except in 1976, 1980 and 1984) and GLS panel results. As 
expected, both the share of irrigated area and non-land production assets have positive 
and significant effects.  
The regression results on variance of log income per capita are not stable over time. 
However, it is noted that variance is influenced by some household characteristics, such 
as household size and its square (e.g., the effect of the former is negative and significant 
in 1976 while that of the latter is positive and significant), non-land production assets 
(e.g., the former has a positive and significant coefficient in 1982, but the value is 
small) and schooling years of household head and its square (e.g., the former has a 
positive and significant effect in 1975 and the latter has a negative and significant  
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effect). Thus the Chaudhuri-Jalan-Suryahadi specification (2002) yields plausible 
results.  
The VEP measure is then constructed for each household by the cross-sectional 
regression for each year and also by the panel regression. We compare VEP measures 
with VEU measures across different groups of households later in this section.  
4.2  Vulnerability as low expected utility (VEU) 
Table 5 provides results of IV estimation for Equations (19) and (20). Since differences 
between coefficients of the fixed effects IV and the random effects specifications are 
not systematic at the 5 per cent level when using the Hausmann test, the random effects 
IV specification is preferred (Baltagi 2005). The first stage regression on the normalized 
household income yields results similar to the panel regression in Table 4 except that 
high caste dummy does not have a significant positive coefficient.13 In the second stage, 
normalized household consumption (i.e., consumption which is normalized so that the 
mean is unity) is estimated by normalized household income. The coefficient of 
household income is positive and highly significant, implying that if income increases 
by one unit, consumption will increase by 0.5524. High caste households tend to 
consume more than the rest. These results are used to derive various expectations of 
consumption in (14′), using restricted least squares and then these expectations are 
converted into utility (16).  
Table 6 shows the decomposition of the VEU measure; 0.7476 in the head of the second 
column is our estimate of the vulnerability of the whole households. It is not necessarily 
easy to give it an intuitive interpretation, but this implies that the utility of the average 
household is 75 per cent less than the hypothetical situation without any risk or 
inequality in consumption. In other words, vulnerability so defined is high.     
Of course, the results presume a specific form of utility function (16) that may not 
necessarily reflect individual preferences. However, our estimate suggests a potentially 
very large effect of inequality and poverty on household utility. Our estimate of 
VEU=0.7476 is much larger than the Bulgarian estimate of 0.1972, reported by Ligon 
and Schechter (2003). It is surmised that this large difference is due to the larger 
magnitudes of risk and inequality of consumption in rural India, and the fact that we use 
annual consumption data in rural area for 10 years and Ligon and Schechter (2003) use 
monthly consumption data for 12 months.   
An important finding is that the vulnerability arising from risk (0.4426; 59 per cent of 
total vulnerability), as the sum of aggregate 0.1671 (22 per cent) and idiosyncratic risks, 
0.2750 (37 per cent), is very large. Indeed, it is even larger than the vulnerability 
associated with poverty, 0.2586 (35 per cent). This is in sharp contrast with Ligon and 
Schechter’s (2003) finding where the corresponding risk component is 0.0279 (14 per 
cent of the total vulnerability), as the sum of the aggregate (0.0264; 13 per cent) and 
idiosyncratic risks, (0.0014; 1 per cent). The vulnerability associated with poverty is 
 
                                                 
13  It is because significant coefficient of ‘high caste’ in the second stage in turn has affected the first 
stage in the iterative estimation.   
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Table 5 
Results for VEU (vulnerability as expected low utility) measure 
G2SLS random effects IV regression for panel data, 1975-84  
 Variable  First stage  Second state 
 Normalized  hh  income  Normalized hh income 
  Coeff. (β)  t-value  Coeff. (γ)  t-value 
yit           
Normalized income per capita  –  –  0.5524  (8.31)** 
Xit           
Age of household head  0.0526  (4.39)**  0.0068   (0.30) 
Age of household head squared   -0.0005   (-4.56)**  -0.0001   (-0.27) 
Household size squared  -0.1671   (-7.66)**  -0.0414   (-1.04) 
Household size squared  0.0038  (3.11)**  0.0011   (0.51) 
Caste dummies  (high)  -0.0398   (-0.55)  0.2450   (1.96)+ 
  (middle high)  0.2801   (3.90)**  0.0237   (0.18) 
  (middle low)  0.0910   (1.36)  0.0528   (0.43) 
Li           
Owned area of land  0.0791   (6.49)**  –  – 
Owned area squared  -0.0020   (-5.26)**  –  – 
Share of irrigated land  0.0045   (3.59)**  –  – 
Non-land production assets  0.0000   (11.39)**  –  – 
Non-land assets squared  0.0000   (-3.15)**  –  – 
Hi           
Schooling yrs of hh head  0.0176  (1.07)  0.0053   (0.18) 
Schooling yrs squared  -0.0011   (-0.79)  -0.0007   (-0.26) 
Dt           
Whether in the crop year  1976  0.0733   (0.93)  -0.1375   (-0.95) 
    1977  0.2848   (3.62)**  0.0937   (0.64) 
    1978  0.1692   (2.14)*  -0.2052   (-1.41) 
    1979  0.2704   (3.38)**  -0.1324   (-0.89) 
    1980  0.2136   (2.64)**  -0.1285   (-0.86) 
    1981  0.5263   (6.37)**  -0.1676   (-1.07) 
    1982  0.6914   (8.26)**  -0.8669   (-5.32)** 
    1983  0.8348   (9.79)**  -0.7004   (-4.08)** 
    1984  0.7745   (8.70)**  -0.6574   (-3.77)** 
Constant  -0.4726   (-1.53)  0.6220   (1.09) 
    
    
No. of observations    1184    1184 
Wald Chi2 (22) Wald  Chi2 (22) 1020  Wald  Chi2 (13) 142 
Hausmann test for the choice          
between fixed effects IV model  Chi2 =  19.57     
and random effects IV model  Prob>Chi2 = 0.297     




also large in our case (0.2586; 35 per cent), much larger than that in Bulgaria, 0.1079 
(31 per cent of the total vulnerability).  
Our results are different from Ligon’s (2005), based on the ICRISAT data for three 
villages, Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara, for 1976-81. The latter show that:  
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i)  Idiosyncratic risk for consumption is generally small, as it ranged from 2 to 
4 per cent of the total risk (i.e., the sum of aggregate and idiosyncratic risks 
and unexplained risk and measurement errors); 
ii)  Aggregate risk is large except in Shirapur (58 per cent of total risk in 
Aurepalle, 5 per cent in Shirapur and 26 per cent in Kanzara); and 
iii)  Unexplained risk is large in all three villages (38 per cent of the total risk in 
Aurepalle, 88 per cent in Shirapur and 60 per cent in Kanzara).  
These results are different for the following reasons:  
i)  We have used adjusted consumption data, corrected for measurement errors, 
while Ligon (2005) uses unadjusted data;  
ii)  Our specifications differ from Ligon’s (2005);14  
iii)  All three villages are considered together for 1975-84 in our analysis, while 
Ligon (2005) considers each village separately for 1976-81. Although the sum 
of idiosyncratic and unexplained risks in the total risk is similar (66 per cent in 
our case and 70 per cent in Ligon’s 2005), it is surmised that some unexplained 
risks and measurement errors in Ligon’s (2005) analysis are, in fact, 
idiosyncratic risks, as reported in our study.   
Although generalizations of our findings to different settings are not straightforward, 
our analysis suggests that vulnerability associated with idiosyncratic and aggregate 
shocks has a significant negative impact on a household’s wellbeing. Our analysis also 
suggests that completely insuring against idiosyncratic risks has a larger impact on the 
average utility of households than completely eliminating inequality.  
In another exercise, we regress each component of vulnerability on timeseries means of 
various household characteristics to explore the determinants of vulnerability in Table 6. 
A household headed by an older member has lower (total) VEU measure because of 
lower vulnerability associated with poverty. On the other hand, a larger household tends 
to have a higher VEU measure because of the higher poverty measure. Also, the more 
non-land production assets a household has, the lower the VEU measure of poverty is. 
Turning to aggregate shocks, households in high caste and in middle-low caste tend to 
be less vulnerable to them. Households in middle-low caste and those with lower owned 
land are more vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks. This suggests that the landless or 
small farmers tend to be vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks resulting in reduced 
consumption.  
We have carried out regressions for estimated VEP measures and static poverty measure 
using the same specification to do comparisons of determinants of different 
vulnerability measures and static poverty (Table 7). Static poverty can be simply 
defined by comparing log household income per capita with a poverty threshold of 
Rs 180 per capita of income per year at 1960-61 prices. Static poverty is estimated by 
fixed-effects probit model by fitting it to those below the poverty cut off point. 
                                                 
14  We have used IV estimates of household income whereas Ligon (2005) employs the Newey-West 
estimator whereby the cross-sectional correlation is adjusted but does not instrument income in the 
consumption function.  
 
Table 6 
Decomposition of VEU (vulnerability as expected low utility) and its determinants 




= Poverty (inequality) 
0.2586 
+ Aggregate risk 
0.1671 
+ Idiosyncratic risk 
0.2750 
+ Unexpected risk 
0.0470 
   Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
Xi                   
Age of household head  -0.1903   (-2.31)*  -0.0876  (-2.50)* 0.0361    (0.68) -0.0128  (-0.09) -0.1260    (-1.18) 
Age of household head squared   0.0017   (2.11)*  0.0008  (2.28)* -0.0003    (-0.52)  0.0000 (-0.02)  0.0012   (1.17) 
Household size squared  0.3246   (1.81)+  0.2291  (3.00)** 0.0024   (0.02)  0.1460  (0.49) -0.0529    (-0.23) 
Household size squared  -0.0019   (-0.18)  -0.0081  (-1.75)+ -0.0006   (-0.08)  0.0036 (0.20)  0.0031    (0.22) 
Caste dummies  (high)  0.0357   (0.07)  -0.2194  (-1.07) -0.5049    (-1.62)  0.8656 (1.07) -0.1056    (-0.17) 
  (middle high)  -0.0721   (-0.15)  -0.2305  (-1.13)  -0.0643   (-0.21)  -0.0208  (-0.03) 0.2435    (0.39) 
  (middle low)  0.5487   (1.27)  -0.0123  (-0.07)  -0.4380   (-1.58)  1.5197  (2.11)* -0.5207    (-0.94) 
Li                   
Owned area of land  -0.1570   (-1.53)  -0.0411  (-0.94) 0.0666    (1.01)  -0.2983  (-1.74)+ 0.1158   (0.87) 
Owned area squared  0.0040   (1.35)  0.0013  (1.05)  -0.0015   (-0.78)  0.0071  (1.44)  -0.0030   (-0.78) 
Share of irrigated land  -0.0006   (-0.04)  -0.0029  (-0.48) -0.0023    (-0.25)  0.0034 (0.15)  0.0012    (0.06) 
Non-land production assets  -0.0001   (-1.19)  -0.0001  (-2.69)** 0.0000    (-0.33)  0.0000 (0.17)  0.0000    (-0.09) 
Non-land assets squared  0.0000   (1.20)  0.0000  (2.16)* 0.0000    (0.23)  0.0000 (0.19) 0.0000    (-0.15) 
Hi                   
Schooling yrs of household head  -0.1259   (-0.95)  -0.0293  (-0.52) 0.0478    (0.56)  -0.1844 (-0.83)  0.0401   (0.23) 
Schooling yrs squared  0.0063   (0.57) 0.0017  (0.37)  -0.0057    (-0.81) 0.0128 (0.69) -0.0024    (-0.17) 
Constant 4.7809    (2.25)  2.2663  (2.51)  -0.7829    (-0.57) 0.1343  (0.04) 3.1633    (1.15) 
  
  
No.  of  observations  1184   1184   1184   1184   1184   
Joint significance: F (14, 117) =  2.73**    4.23**   0.64   0.91   0.38   
R squared  0.1874    0.3358    0.0542   0.0758   0.0381  







Determinants of VEP (vulnerability as expected poverty) measure and static poverty 
 VEP    Poverty 
 
(based on cross-
sectional data)  (based on panel data    (statis binary variable)
   Coeff.  t-value    Coeff.  t-value    Coeff.  t-value 
Xi                
Age of household head  -0.0456   (-4.11)**  -0.0108  (-1.10)  -0.0595    (-1.42) 
Age of household head squared   0.0002   (1.57)   0.0000  (-0.45)   0.0005    (1.31) 
Household size squared  0.1687   (11.09)**  0.2038  (15.13)**   0.3140    (5.25)**
Household size squared  -0.0063   (-7.97)**  -0.0073  (-10.48)**   -0.0078    (-2.69)**
Caste dummies   (high)  -0.1513   (-1.07)   -0.4644  (-3.69)**   -0.4637    (-2.05)* 
  (middle high)  0.1243   (1.00)    -0.2384 (-2.17)*    -0.5790    (-2.55)* 
  (middle low)  -  - -  -    -0.3556   (-1.70)+ 
Li                
Owned area of land  -0.0426   (-4.46)**   -0.0607 (-7.18)**    -0.1444    (-3.74)**
Owned area squared  0.0006   (1.89)+    0.0009 (3.07)**    0.0027    (2.21)* 
Share of irrigated land  -0.0024   (-3.94)**  -0.0026  (-4.76)**   -0.0052    (-1.19) 
Non-land production assets  0.0000   (-3.33)**  0.0000  (-7.04)**   0.0000    (-2.26)* 
Non-land assets squared  0.0000   (3.80)**  0.0000  (6.76)**   0.0000    (-0.35) 
Hi                
Schooling yrs of hh head  -0.0126   (-1.14)   0.0071  (0.72)   0.0215    (0.37) 
Schooling yrs squared  0.0011   (1.07)    -0.0015 (-1.67)    -0.0034    (-0.67) 
constant 1.7697    (6.00)    0.7258  (2.78)     1.1602   (1.08) 
        
        
No. of observations  1181    1181      1181   
Joint significance test  F(13, 1036) = 36.04**  F(13, 1036) = 51.51**  Wald Chi2(14)  = 118.01**
Hausmann test for the choice 
between random-effects model 
and fixed-effects model 
Chi2(11) =  86.03**  Chi2(11) =  21.01**    N/A   
R squared  0.2799    0.5942      0.2488  (Pseudo R2)




It is noted that determinants of poverty and those of VEP measures are quite similar. In 
particular, landholding is crucial in both poverty reduction and reduction of 
vulnerability. Non-land assets also reduce poverty and vulnerability. However, having 
an older person as a household head is significant in reducing the cross-sectional VEP 
measure and VEU measure, but it is not significant in poverty reduction. On the other 
hand, caste is one of the significant determinants of poverty, but not of vulnerability 
(i.e., VEU and cross-sectional VEP). Surprisingly, variables on schooling years of head 
are not significant.   
4.3  Vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk (VER) 
The results for VER are presented in Table 8. We estimate Equations (21) and (22) by 
applying random-effects GLS15 to the annual data for three sample villages, Aurepalle, 
Shirapur and Kanzara. The specification in Case A of each column is same as in 
Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) except that we have added household characteristics. 
                                                 
15 The Hausmann test favours random effects over fixed effects in all cases in Table 4.   
 
Table 8 
Results for VER (vulnerability as uninsured exposure to risk) 
GLS random effects, GLS for panel data, 1975-84 
 Aurepalle  Shirapur  Kanzara 
  Case A  Case B  Case A  Case B  Case A  Case B 
   Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value   Coeff.  t-value  Coeff. t-value    Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Δln yit: First difference of log income  0.2065 (5.34)** 0.2185 (5.32)** 0.0974 (2.39)*  0.0717 (1.83)+   0.5383 (4.91)** 0.3999 (3.63)** 
Δln yit: First difference of village mean 
of log income 
0.0887 (0.94)  – –   -0.4539   (-3.86)**  – –   -1.3910  (-4.46)** –  – 
Crop shock variable  – –  0.1753 (3.02)**  – –  -0.7198 (-3.40)**   –  –  -0.3234 (-1.30) 
Schooling yrs of hh head  0.0361 (0.85) 0.0311 (0.74)   0.0153   (0.62)  0.0204  (0.82)    0.0046 (0.14) 0.0032 (0.09) 
Schooling yrs squared  -0.0012 (-0.27) -0.0008 (-0.20)   -0.0013   (-0.71)  -0.0018  (-0.95)   0.0002  (0.07)  0.0004  (0.11) 
Household size   -0.0131 (-0.31) -0.0104 (-0.25)   -0.0266   (-0.55)  -0.0299  (-0.61)   -0.0146  (-0.38)  -0.0129  (-0.32) 
Household size squared  0.0003 (0.10) 0.0002 (0.08)   0.0012   (0.43)  0.0014  (0.48)    0.0010 (0.48) 0.0009 (0.41) 
∆Household size   -0.2162 (-2.83)** -0.2066 (-2.73)** -0.2568   (-2.20)*  -0.2683  (-2.29)*   0.0513  (0.43) -0.0222 (-0.18) 
∆Household size squared  0.0046 (0.87) 0.0034 (0.66)   0.0101   (1.70)+  0.0104  (1.74)+   -0.0060 (-0.85) -0.0039 (-0.54) 
Caste dummies   (high)  -0.1695 (-1.31) -0.1650 (-1.30)    0.0228   (0.21)  0.0196  (0.18)    -0.0752 (-0.48) -0.0797 (-0.47) 
 (middle  high)  -0.2521 (-1.57) -0.2358 (-1.50)    0.1025   (0.54)  0.1081  (0.57)    -0.0516 (-0.48) -0.0472 (-0.42) 
 (middle  low)  -0.0228 (-0.34) -0.0180 (-0.27)   -0.0340   (-0.28)  -0.0490  (-0.40)   -0.0667  (-0.43)  -0.0546  (-0.34) 
Constant  0.1121 (0.78) 0.0998 (0.70)   0.1265   (0.63)  0.1501  (0.74)    0.1124 (0.77) 0.0097 (0.06) 
    
    
No.  of  observations  351    347    349  345   351  346  
Joint significance: Wald Chi
2 (11) =  110.29**  117.41   28.17**    25.66**    41.91**  23.57*  
Hausmann test for the choice 
between random & fixed-effects  4.68  4.47   3.31    3.30   1.74  1.97  
Model: Chi
2(11) =                   
R squared  0.2455  0.2595   0.0771    0.0715   0.1100  0.0695  
Notes:  Case A: village mean of log income used; 
  Case B: Crop shock measure used; 





The results in Case A are generally consistent with Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997). 
Complete risk-sharing hypothesis (i.e., β = 0 where β is the coefficient of ) y ln ( vy Δ ) is 
not rejected in Aurepalle (which implies that risk is shared among households in this 
village). In Shirapur and Kanzara, β is negative and significant. That is, in bad periods, 
the consumption is well (or over) insured in these villages.  
In Case B where we use the crop shock measure instead of ) y ln ( vy Δ , in Aurepalle, 
consumption is significantly reduced in the event of a negative shock and vice versa. 
Hence there is no insurance against a crop shock. However, in both Shirapur and 
Kanzara,  β is negative and significant, implying that some sort of risk-insurance 
mechanism was in place, implying that the risk was shared among households during a 
crop shock in these two villages. 
This raises the issue of why VEU arising from idiosyncratic risks is so high despite 
risk-sharing mechanisms? One possibility is that income risk is so large that risk-sharing 
can reduce only a part of the idiosyncratic shocks. Even if there is a constant 
consumption over the years to completely eliminate the idiosyncratic VEU, 
consumption will still vary as risk-sharing ceases to be effective when aggregate shocks 
occur. Moreover, some aggregate shocks (e.g., earthquakes) cannot be insured against. 
4.4  Vulnerability across different groups 
Tables 9 and 10 contain descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix of vulnerability 
measures. POVERTY denotes static poverty measured by the head-count index (i.e., 
proportion of household’s with a per capita income below a cut-off point, z). It is not 
surprising that the correlation between POVERTY and VEU_POVERTY is high (the 
coefficient being 0.52), but it must be noted that POVERTY is not highly correlated with 
VEU_AGGREGATE or VEU_IDIOSYNCRATIC. But the VEP measure (an ex ante 
measure), obtained from a cross-section regression as well as from a panel using GLS, 
is highly correlated with POVERTY (with correlation coefficients of 0.57 and 0.48, 
respectively). A valid inference, therefore, is that poverty is related to but distinct from 
vulnerability. So also are ex ante (VEP) and ex post measures (VEU) of vulnerability 
related but distinct concepts. Their correlations (i.e., 0.25 to 0.26) are not high but non-
negligible.  
Table 9 
Descriptive statistics of vulnerability measure 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std  dev.  Min.  Max. 
VEP (based on each cross sectional data)  1181  0.498  0.429  0.000   1.000  
VEP_GLS (based on panel data)  1181  0.479  0.480  0.000   1.000  
POVERTY (static measure of poverty)  1181  0.477  0.500  0.000   1.000  
VEU   1181  0.748  1.739  -0.547   18.050  
VEU_POVERTY  1181  0.259  0.556  -0.801   6.917  
VEU_AGGREGATE 1181  0.167  0.828  -6.425   4.397  
VEU_IDIOSYNCRATIC 1181  0.275 2.749 -6.380    21.051   































































































































V E P   1 . 0 0                      
VEP_GLS  0.80  1.00                    
POVERTY  0.57  0.48  1.00                   
VEU  0.26  0.25  0.27  1.00                 
VEU_POVERTY  0.54  0.54  0.52  0.41 1.00                
VEU_AGGREGATE  0.11  0.12  0.08  -0.24 -0.10 1.00               
VEU_IDIOSYNCRATIC  0.10 0.10 0.09 0.59 0.19 -0.42 1.00              
VEU_UNEXPLAINED -0.10  -0.12  -0.06  0.04 -0.13 -0.01 -0.71 1.00                    
school  -0.31  -0.30  -0.21  -0.14 -0.25 -0.10 -0.08 0.09 1.00         
ownarea  -0.42 -0.42 -0.32 -0.17 -0.43 -0.03 -0.08 0.08 0.44 1.00        
lowcast  0.36 0.39 0.25 0.04 0.32 0.14 -0.06 -0.02 -0.29 -0.29 1.00        
midlcast  0.12 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.04 0.19 -0.12 -0.21 -0.16 -0.30 1.00       
midhcast -0.06  -0.04  0.00  -0.05 -0.03 0.12 -0.10 0.05 0.04 -0.07 -0.27 -0.26  1.00    
highcast  -0.37 -0.40 -0.24 -0.14 -0.30 -0.19 -0.03 0.09 0.42 0.46 -0.41 -0.39 -0.35 1.00
 
Table 11 
Comparisons of vulnerability across different groups 
  Land-holding status 
Variable Landless  Small  farmers Middle farmers  Large farmers 
VEP (based on each cross sectional data) 0.643  0.632  0.511  0.195 
VEP_GLS (based on panel data)  0.604 0.631  0.513 0.163 
POVERTY (static measure of poverty) 0.671  0.571  0.498  0.156 
VEU   0.905  1.213  0.615  0.208 
VEU_POVERTY 0.559  0.363  0.229  -0.150 
VEU_AGGREGATE 0.267  0.023  0.371  0.052 
VEU_IDIOSYNCRATIC 0.264  0.965 -0.343  0.051 
VEU_UNEXPLAINED -0.186  -0.138  0.358  0.254 
  Household head's years of schooling  
Variable  0  < = 5  > 5   
VEP (based on each cross sectional data)  0.622  0.362  0.293   
VEP_GLS (based on panel data) 0.597  0.373  0.250   
POVERTY (static measure of poverty) 0.569  0.351  0.359   
VEU   1.010  0.396  0.407   
VEU_POVERTY 0.396  0.060  0.100   
VEU_AGGREGATE 0.204  0.106  0.137   
VEU_IDIOSYNCRATIC 0.543  -0.026  -0.157   
VEU_UNEXPLAINED -0.133  0.257  0.327   
 Caste 
Variable Low  Middle-low  Middle-high  High 
VEP (based on each cross sectional data)  0.769 0.591 0.442 0.280 
VEP_GLS (based on panel data)  0.815 0.560 0.434 0.216 
POVERTY (static measure of poverty) 0.701 0.496 0.476 0.309 
VEU    0.881 1.250 0.579 0.423 
VEU_POVERTY  0.574 0.303 0.225 0.029 
VEU_AGGREGATE 0.367  0.109  0.376  -0.049 
VEU_IDIOSYNCRATIC -0.039 1.272  -0.268 0.148 
VEU_UNEXPLAINED  -0.020 -0.433  0.245  0.295  
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Table 12 
Cross-tabulation by different categories 
Variable 
Landless  
and no schooling 
Landless 
 and low cast 
Landless, no schooling 
and low cast 
VEP (based on each cross sectional data)  0.694  0.811  0.771 
VEP_GLS (based on panel data) 0.658  0.847  0.805 
POVERTY (static measure of poverty) 0.698  0.755 0.726 
VEU   0.965  0.976  0.877 
VEU_POVERTY 0.604  0.679  0.580 
VEU_AGGREGATE 0.356  0.509  0.435 
VEU_IDIOSYNCRATIC 0.331  -0.223  0.032 
VEU_UNEXPLAINED -0.326  0.011  -0.170 
     
 
Small farmers  
and no schooling 
Small farmers 
and low caste 
Small farmers, no 
schooling and low cast
VEP (based on each cross sectional data)  0.716  0.834  0.839 
VEP_GLS (based on panel data) 0.721  0.896  0.884 
POVERTY (static measure of poverty) 0.637  0.728 0.784 
VEU   1.543  0.869  0.907 
VEU_POVERTY 0.427  0.599  0.636 
VEU_AGGREGATE 0.019  0.117  0.115 
VEU_IDIOSYNCRATIC 1.365  0.373  0.523 
VEU_UNEXPLAINED -0.268  -0.221  -0.368 
 
 
Tables 11 and 12 summarize means of various vulnerability measures by landholding 
class, household head’s schooling years and caste. Here are some observations.  
–  The landless or small farmers are more vulnerable than larger farmers. In 
particular, small farmers face large idiosyncratic consumption risk.  
–  A household headed by a person without education is much more vulnerable and 
poorer than that headed by a person with some education. However, increasing 
schooling years does not have a dramatic effect on vulnerability.  
–  Households in lower castes are more vulnerable than those in higher/upper 
castes.  
–  If households are landless and at the same time without education or in low 
castes, they are highly vulnerable to aggregate shocks.  
5 Concluding  observations 
Some important findings are summarized from a larger policy perspective.  
An attempt was made to assess the vulnerability of rural households in the semi-arid 
tract of south India, based upon the ICRISAT panel survey. Both ex ante and ex post 
measures of vulnerability were computed. The latter were decomposed into aggregate 
and idiosyncratic risk and poverty components. Our decomposition shows that 
idiosyncratic risks account for the largest share (37 per cent), followed by poverty (35 
per cent) and aggregate risk (22 per cent). It is somewhat surprising that idiosyncratic 
risks (e.g., illness or unemployment) contribute more than poverty to vulnerability. 
Despite some degree of risk-sharing at the village level, the landless or small farmers 
are vulnerable to idiosyncratic risks, forcing them to reduce consumption. Subsets  
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comprising the landless without education or members of lower castes are highly 
vulnerable to idiosyncratic and aggregate risks.  
An important conclusion that emerges from the empirical analysis is that, while poverty 
and vulnerability are related and overlap to some extent, these are distinct concepts and 
the latter broadens the area of intervention. Deprivation must be viewed from a larger 
perspective that goes beyond poverty status in a specific year or month, allowing for 
frequent and large changes in income, sources of income and prices, as a consequence 
of changes in the policy regime, natural disasters, conflicts, seasonality of agricultural 
production and personal misfortunes. If credit and insurance markets were complete and 
worked efficiently, the case for a shift in anti-poverty policies would be weak. A 
feature, however, of rural areas—especially in the semi-arid region—is that not only 
such markets are incomplete but are also subject to imperfections. So a broader area of 
intervention is consistent with a deeper concern for poverty reduction. Briefly, careful 
attention must be given to combining income-augmenting policies with those that not 
only reduce aggregate and idiosyncratic risks but also build resilience against them, as 
elaborated below.  
Responses to risks are usually classified into: (i) risk reducing; (ii) risk mitigating; and 
(iii) risk coping. This classification must, however, be used with some caution because 
of overlapping categories. Income diversification at the household level, for example, 
could be interpreted both as a risk reducing and risk mitigating measure. Similarly, 
workfare could be viewed both as a risk mitigating and a risk coping measure. Finally, 
nothing is implied about the workability and/or effectiveness of these measures as they 
are context-specific. Whether smallholders sell bullocks when a crop fails, or borrow 
more frequently or simply participate more in public works programmes depends 
largely on the context. A related issue is that while some of the responses at different 
levels may be mutually reinforcing (e.g., income diversification, microfinance and 
agricultural research and extension), others may undermine the role of some (e.g., social 
security may adversely affect precautionary savings, social assistance may erode 
informal networks of support, workfare may discourage job search and income 
diversification). 
In conclusion, so while there is a case for broadening the area of intervention, it is far 
from obvious what the trade-offs are between income diversification, savings and 
different forms of insurance. The challenge of poverty reduction lies, therefore, not so 
much in a standard menu of policies but a clearer and deeper understanding of the risks 
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Appendix 1: Characteristics of study regions and villages 
Mahbubnagar   Sholapur   Akola 
Aurepalle           Dokur  Shirapur           Kalman  Kanzara               Kinkheda 
– Rainfall unassured;  – Rainfall unassured; frequent 
crop failure 
– Rainfall assured 
– Pronounced rainfall uncertainty at 
sowing 
– Deep black soils in lowlands; 
shallower lighter soils in 
uplands 
– Black soils; fairly homogenous 
– Red soil; marked soil 
heterogeneity 
– Rabi, or post-rainy season, 
cropping 
– Kharif cropping 
– Kharif, or rainy season, cropping  – Rabi sorghum  – Upland cotton, mung bean, and 
hybrid sorghum 
– Paddy, castor, local kharif 
sorghum, pearl millet,and pigeon 
pea 
– Some dug wells  – Limited irrigation sources in 
1970s and early 1980s 
– Agricultural intensification around 
dug wells and tanks- 
– Technologically stagnant  – Sustained technical change in 
dryland agriculture 
– Neglect of dryland agriculture  – Tenancy; dearth of bullocks; 
more equitable distribution of 
land 
– More educated 
– Harijans and caste rigidities; 
inequitable distribution of land 
ownership 
  
Source:   Walker and Ryan (1990).  
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Appendix 2: Trend of crop shocks in sample villages  
Figure 1 
Crop shock in Aurepalle and Dokur in Andhra Pradesh 
 








Aurepalle  Dokur 
 




Crop shock in Shirapur, Kalman and Kanzara in Maharashtra 
 














Note:  Crop shock is averaged for each village.  
Source for Figures 1 and 2: Gaiha and Imai (2004)  
 